This paper addresses the manner in which political and economic factors affect the voting behavior of House representatives on free trade agreement (FTA) implementation bills in the 108th and 109th Congresses in the U.S., using a simultaneous probit-tobit model consisting of contribution and voting equations. We find that representatives whose districts have relatively higher employment in 'trade-sensitive' sectors are likely to oppose FTA bills. By comparing our results with the reports of the U.S. International Trade Commission, we discover that the voting behavior of representatives is more receptive to the sectors predicted to be adversely affected by an FTA than to those predicted otherwise. Another finding is that when FTA bills, for which partner countries do not share commonalities, are considered on the same day in the House, members' voting behavior may be similar.
Introduction
The U.S. Congress plays a substantial role in bilateral or multilateral trade agreements including free trade agreements (FTAs) . As is shown Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution, most of the powers for trade negotiation lie with Congress. However, generally, the administration has undertaken negotiations on trade agreements under the aegis of the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), formerly known as the Fast Track Authority. The TPA grants negotiation rights to the executive branch of government with expedited procedures for implementing legislation, and final agreements may not be amended by Congress if the administration follows the procedures specified by the TPA. Still, the agreements submitted as a form of implementation must be approved by both the House of Representatives and the Senate.
In this paper, as is shown in Table 1 , we utilize the roll-call results of seven FTA implementation bills submitted to the House during the 108 th (2003) (2004) and 109 th (2005) (2006) Congresses, and evaluate the political and economic factors that may exert effects on voting decisions in the House regarding these bills. As this paper investigates only FTA bills, we can compare voting behavior of House members between some pairs of FTA bills and assess any common or differing characteristics in these behaviors. As an empirical model, we employ a simultaneous probit-tobit model to address the endogeneity of political action committee (PAC) contributions in the voting decisions of representatives. Contributions from interest groups such as PACs are endogenous in the sense that they would contribute more to representatives who are more likely to vote in accordance with the agenda of the interest groups and, conversely, contribute less to those less likely to support their principles. As demonstrated in the previous literature Magee, 2000a and 2000b) , we find that larger contributions from labor PACs are likely to influence representatives to oppose FTA bills, but that larger contributions from business PACs are likely to influence them to approve FTA bills. Also, we find that Republican representatives are more likely to vote in favor of FTAs and Democratic representatives are less likely to do so. We have also determined that unemployment and the proportion of less-skilled workers in a district are negatively related to a representative's approval of FTA bills. We expect that this effect derives from public sentiment maintaining that FTAs may result in a surge of cheap imports, thus costing American jobs, and that free trade may expedite the export of jobs to foreign countries.
The principal findings of the paper, however, are as follows. Representatives whose districts have relatively more employment in textiles including apparel and leather; petrochemical products including chemicals, plastics, and rubber; and electronics are less likely to approve FTA bills. According to recent statistics regarding the approval of Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), a program designed to assist workers who lose their jobs due to surges in foreign imports, these industries are the ones that have been most adversely affected by trade liberalization-the so-called "trade-sensitive industries".
It can be argued that representatives' voting behavior reflects the interests of their congressional districts. For example, should an FTA prove detrimental to employment in the principal industries in a given congressional district, that representative would tend not to vote in favor of the FTA bill. By comparing our results with the reports of the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), in which the potential economic effects of FTAs are investigated prior to Congressional consideration of FTAs, we determine that representatives whose districts have relatively high employment in the sectors for which the USITC predicted negative effects tend to be less likely to vote for the particular FTA in question. However, our results do not generally support the supposition that representatives are likely to vote for an FTA when their districts include sectors for which the USITC predicted positive effects. In a nutshell, USITC predictions of negative employment effects from an FTA have a significant impact on congressional voting but that predictions of positive employment effects do not.
We find that when FTA bills, for which partner countries do not share commonalities, are considered on the same day in the House, members' voting behavior may be similar. A case in point would be the Chile and Singapore FTA bills, both of which were roll-called on the same day, July 24 th 2003. Although the two countries share no similarities in terms of economy, geography, or culture, members' voting behavior on the two FTA bills was very similar. One possible explanation for this is that when they vote on the two bills on the same day, House members perhaps perceive them as a single package bill. Finally, we have determined that larger Hispanic populations in districts do not necessarily translate into higher approval rates on FTAs with Latin American countries, as can be seen in the Dominican Republic-Central America (DR-CA) FTA bill.
The main implication for future FTA bills to be considered in Congress is that the likelihood that representatives will vote for an FTA bill decreases with Democratic partisanship, higher [lower] contributions from labor [business] PACs, and higher unemployment rates and higher employment ratios in 'trade-sensitive' industries in their districts such as textiles and apparel, petrochemical products, and electronic products.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Previous literature relevant to this paper is reviewed in Section 2. Section 3 provides brief descriptions of the FTA bills in the 108th and 109th Congresses. Section 4 describes the models and data. In Section 5, we present the econometric results, compare the results with the USITC's reports, and provide some pair-wise comparisons between FTA bills. Finally, our conclusions are presented in Section 6.
Literature Review
A large number of literature in both economics and political science has investigated the determinants of legislators' trade policy votes. Potters and Sloof (1996) surveyed the empirical literature examining the influence of interest groups on the formation of a variety of public policies. Romer and Snyder (1994) demonstrated that contributions to House members by PACs perform a crucial role in the decisions of committees on which the representatives are included. Beaulieu and Magee (2004) construct a dataset linking both business and labor PACs to the industries they represent, and assess the manner in which factors in production and industry characteristics (and some combinations thereof) influence the preferences of PACs. They found no significant differences between business PACs representing import-competing and exporting industries in their support for trade liberalization. In contrast, labor PACs representing importcompeting industries demonstrated more significantly opposition to trade liberalization than those representing exporting industries, although the evidence for this was rather weak. Their results suggest that there exists considerable variation in preference for trade policy within labor groups but not within capital groups. Magee (2008) Chae et al. (2007) analyzed the relationship between PAC contributions and the voting behavior of representatives in the 107 th Congress. They found that members who obtained more funds from labor PACs were likely to oppose the Trade Act of 2002, which included the TPA, and, conversely, those who obtained more funds from business PACs were likely to approve it. Additionally, they found that House members in the Ways and Means Committee obtained more funds from business PACs, but members of the Education and Labor Committee obtained less funds from business PACs, ceteris paribus. However, funds from labor PACs are not statistically significantly dependent on which committees they are on.
There has also been some research regarding voting behavior in experimental economic fields, such as in the studies of Frechette, Kagel, and Lehrer (2003) ; Morelli (2005a and 2005b); Sung (2007) ; and Kagel, Sung, and Winter (2010) . Their results demonstrate that the level of benefit that voters receive would be the key variable in explaining voting patterns. For House representatives who vote on bills, the benefit would include more funds from PACs. Thus, the experimental results also imply that PAC contributions may be one of the material variables that explain the voting behavior of representatives.
The work by Magee (2000a and 2000b) is the most closely related to this study. Baldwin and Magee (2000a) examined congressional voting behavior on three trade bills in the 1990s: the NAFTA bill of 1993, the implementation laws on the results of the Uruguay Round (UR) of 1994, and the Fast Track bill of 1998. Baldwin and Magee (2000b) addressed the extension of most favored nation (MFN) treatment to China in 1994, as well as the NAFTA and the UR bills. In both papers, it was found that the ideologies of legislators, PAC contributions, and economic conditions in legislators' districts or states affected their voting behavior on trade bills.
Whereas the majority of previous studies have considered several types of trade bills together, the current study considers FTA bills only. This is particularly useful in investigating representatives' voting behavior in terms of the sectoral effects of FTAs, since each FTA may have different sectoral effects and thus different repercussions on their districts. As described in the introduction, this will allow the comparing of our results with the USITC's sectoral predictions. Furthermore, by investigating FTA bills only, we can provide some pair-wise comparisons of representatives' voting behavior between FTA bills and evaluate any similar or differing characteristics in the voting behavior. FTA bills passed in the 108 th and 109 th Congresses followed the legal procedures codified in the TPA of the Trade Act of 2002. As FTAs should be implemented as public law, they must be approved by both houses of the U.S. Congress. According to the TPA, the implementation acts of trade agreements signed before July 2007 that fulfilled all the requirements specified by the law could pass through Congress without any amendments. Table 2 shows the legislative process under the TPA by which the acts must pass through Congress. As the acts arrive in Congress, they are to be examined by both the House and the Senate. However, typically, the Ways and Means Committee of the House discusses the acts first, as trade agreements inevitably result in changes in tariffs, which are one of the sources of tax revenue for the U.S. government. After the acts pass through the committee in the House, they must be approved in a general session of the House. In the Senate, the acts should be discussed in the Finance Committee first, and subsequently approved in a general session of the Senate. The full legislative process in the Senate must be finalized within 90 days, whereas finalization in the House must be within 60 days. One observation regarding House members' votes on FTA bills in the 108th and 109th Congresses is that their voting behavior is dependent on partisanship. The proportion of members who support trade acts is typically lower for members of the Democratic Party and higher for members of the Republican Party. This is also observed with regard to the FTA bills under investigation, as is shown in Figure 1 . More than 88% of Republican representatives approved FTA bills in the 108 th and 109 th Congresses. However, the rate of approval by Democratic representatives is no higher than 60%, and was lower than 11% for the DR-CA FTA and Oman FTA bills. Another observation is that House members' voting behavior is dependent on their membership on committees. As is shown in Figure 2 , members of the Ways and Means Committee are generally more supportive of FTA bills than are members of the Education and Labor Committee, who are influenced by unions or by other labor-related PACs. 
Model and Data
As reported by Chappell (1982) and Magee (2000a and 2000b) (1) and (2)] in a system of equations that are simultaneously estimated.
For the contribution equations, we have truncated data for contributions, as we observe data on contribution funds only when they are positive. Hence, we estimate the contribution equations via a tobit model. 2 The dependent variables in the two contribution equations are the amount of contributions from labor PACs and business PACs. Y and Z are vectors of variables that influence the contribution funds received by members from labor and business PACs, respectively. We include instrumental variables similar to those employed in the previous literature Magee, 2000a and 2000b) . Instruments are essentially composed of variables that reflect a representative's inclination to support interest groups, legislative power, and probability of re-election. Specifically, instruments in the labor contribution equation include a rating of the representative by the League of Conservation Voters (LCV); a dummy for a we also estimated all FTA bills in each Congress and the two contribution equations simultaneously. See Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix for the estimation results. We find that the results are qualitatively similar to those generated by estimating each FTA bill separately, but the estimates of the voting equations for the 108 th Congress have lower significance levels in general than those obtained from separate estimations. 2 Angrist and Krueger (2001) recommend avoiding non-linear specification in using instruments and using two-stage least squares as a baseline. Hence, as a robustness check, we also estimate a linear model for both the contribution equations and the voting equation using two-stage least squares. The results are reported in Table A .3 in the Appendix. The results are qualitatively similar, although many coefficients in the voting equations have lower significance levels. We thank the editor for suggesting this robustness check. member of the Committee on Education and Labor; and a dummy for a chair of a committee or a leadership position in the House.
3 On the other hand, instruments for business contributions include a rating of the representative by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (COC); a dummy for a member of the Ways and Means Committee; and a dummy for a chair of a committee or a leadership position in the House. The dummy for a Democratic representative is also included in both the contribution equations and the voting equation. However, one should note that, given the above sets of instruments, we are making an exclusion assumption that ratings by interest groups, a committee membership, and a leadership position affect voting of representatives only via their influence on labor and business PAC contributions. 4 Contributions from PACs depend on several characteristics of the representatives. As the ideological position of the Democratic Party is relatively closer to that of labor PACs, whereas the Republican Party's position is closer to that of business PACs, it is anticipated that members would obtain more contributions from PACs that share ideological positions similar to those of their own party. As a high rating by the COC implies that the representative is probusiness, he or she would also be likely to receive more funds from business PACs. However, the LCV rates legislators in terms of environmental protection, which is an important issue in addition to labor in an FTA, and thus a representative with a higher LCV rating is likely to receive more funds from labor PACs. A representative who belongs to the Committee on Ways and Means [Committee on Education and Labor] is expected to obtain more contributions from business PACs [labor PACs]. A chair or leader in the House is expected to receive more contributions from both business and labor PACs, as he or she wields more influence than the other members in the decision-making process.
We include constituency variables in the voting equation, which were also used in Magee (2000a and 2000b) . These are a dummy variable indicating whether a representative is a Democrat; the fraction of the district population possessing no high school diploma; the fraction of the district population that possesses a high school diploma but no college degree; the fraction of the Hispanic population in the district; the unemployment rate in the district; the union membership rate in the state; and the ratios of employment in agriculture and eight manufacturing sectors in the district.
5 Table 3 provides descriptions of the variables in the model, along with their mean values.
3 Compared with Magee (2000a and 2000b) , we use the LCV rating rather than the AFL-CIO rating, and a ranking membership rather than terms in the office of representatives. 4 We thank the editor for making this point. 5 Some of the constituency variables in the voting equation used by Magee (2000a and 2000b) are excluded from our analyses. These are per capita income, export ratio, and the ACU, COC, LCV, and AFL-CIO ratings. PosEmp Ratio of total district employment in the industries for which the USITC predicted positive effects from an FTA n.a. n.a.
NegEmp
Ratio of total district employment in the industries for which the USITC predicted negative effects from an FTA n.a. n.a.
In the voting equation, we expect a negative sign for LabPAC but a positive sign for BusPAC, because labor PACs tend to object to free trade for fear of job loss and business PACs tend to support free trade in anticipation of business opportunities. Unskilled laborers who have not reached high school or obtained a college degree tend to be against FTAs, for fear of losing their jobs. Thus, we anticipate that a representative whose constituency has a large population of unskilled labor will generally vote against FTA bills. Similarly, we expect that a representative whose constituency has a high rate of unemployment and high union membership will vote against FTA bills. We have no predictions with regard to the ratio of the Hispanic population a priori, but we do expect that House members in congressional districts with significant Hispanic populations would be favorable to FTA bills with Latin American countries, such as Chile and DR-CA.
The signs for the ratios of employment in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors depend on the perceptions of representatives regarding the sectoral effects of an FTA in their districts. A particular FTA may prove beneficial for some industries, but detrimental to others. Under the TPA set forth in the Trade Act of 2002, the USITC is required to submit a report assessing the probable effects of a possible FTA on behalf of the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) before the House votes for the FTA. We examine whether the sectoral effects of each FTA predicted by the USITC are consistent with our empirical findings.
Congressional district characteristics such as the Hispanic population, unemployment ratio, and the proportions of constituents without a high school diploma or with a high school diploma but with no college degree were obtained from The employment ratio of a manufacturing sector for each district is calculated on the basis of the level of employment by county, which was obtained from the 2003 and 2005 County Business Patterns. We convert the employment data at the county level to the district level. In doing so, we assume the distribution of the population employed for each industry in a district to be identical to the population distribution of the county for that district. The employment data are for eight manufacturing industries.
The fraction of the population employed in agriculture by district is the number of individuals employed in agriculture by district, obtained from the 2000 
Results
In this section, we report and discuss our results. We begin this section by discussing the results for the 108 th and 109 th Congresses, and subsequently compare the results between two Congresses. Then, we compare our results with the reports of the USITC and provide some paired comparisons between FTA bills. Table 4 shows the estimation results on labor PAC contributions. 7 The estimates of the coefficients of Dem, LCV, and EdLab in the 108 th Congress are all positive and statistically significant at significance levels less than 1% or 5%. This means that a House member obtains more contributions from labor PACs when he or she is in the Democratic Party, has a higher LCV rating, or is on the Education and Labor Committee. This result is predictable, considering that the ideological positions of the Democratic Party and the LCV are generally in favor of labor and environmental issues, and also that the Education and Labor Committee principally discusses issues associated with labor interests. However, estimates for RankMem in the 108 th Congress are all positive but are not statistically significant at any conventional level. Thus, we cannot argue that a House member would receive more contributions from a labor PAC even if he or she is in a ranking position.
Labor and Business PAC Contribution Equations
Also, Dem, LCV, and RankMem in the 109 th Congress have similar impacts on contributions from labor PACs. However, the estimate for EdLab is neither consistently positive nor statistically significant at any conventional levels in the 109 th Congress. Thus, we may conclude that the impact of representatives' 7 We also estimated the contribution equations with all control variables used in the voting equation. For this, we used a linear model for contributions instead of a tobit model because of a convergence problem in the estimation. We found that the results were qualitatively similar and that all control variables were insignificant except the dummy for a Democrat. The results are available upon request to the authors. th Congress are all positive and statistically significant at the 1% or the 5% level for the four FTA bills. This result indicates that Democratic House members receive more contributions from business PACs, which somewhat contradicts the standard narrative, as it is generally held that House members in the Republican Party receive more funds from business due to their business-friendly ideology. 8 The impacts of COC and WaysMeans are predictable because both higher COC ratings and holding a position on the Ways and Means Committee are factors which typically imply a pro-business tendency. Additionally, a representative who is a ranking member obtained more funds from business PACs in the 108 th Congress.
In the 109 th Congress, as is also shown in Table 5 , the estimates for COC, WaysMeans, and RankMem are all positive and statistically significant at a significance level of less than 1%. However, the estimates for Dem are statistically significant only at the 10% level (the DR-CA and the Bahrain FTA bills) or are not statistically significant (the Oman FTA bill). Unlike Democratic representatives in the 108 th Congress, it remains unclear as to whether or not they received more contributions from business PACs in the 109 th Congress. Notes: Approximate standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Notes: Approximate standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Voting Equations
As seen in th Congress. In particular, for Dem, the estimates are large, negative, and statistically significant at the 1% level for the DR-CA and the Oman FTA bills, whose roll-call margins were relatively narrow. Based on this result, one might conclude that party affiliation exerts a profound impact on Congressional votes for bills that are close, but little impact on bills that pass easily. However, this result is largely attributable to the fact that the Republicans voted between 87.8% and 94.2% of the time in favor of all seven FTAs, but the Democrats' support for the FTAs varies widely from 7.4% to 60.6% (see Figure 1) . Thus, it can be asserted that an FTA vote was close when the Democrats chose to contest it, rather than the parties electing to enforce party discipline when they knew the vote would be close.
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As is shown in Table 6 , the estimates of the coefficients of Unemp, Union, NoHS, and NoColl are largely negative in the 108 th Congress whenever those are statistically significant. This implies that House members from districts with higher unemployment, higher union participation rates, or higher ratios of unskilled labor are likely to oppose FTA bills, ceteris paribus. However, the 9 Marginal effects of the estimates in the voting equations are presented in Table 9 , which are to be discussed further. 10 For the discussion on weak instrumental variables, refer to Staiger and Stock (1997) . 11 We thank a referee for suggesting this estimation. 12 We thank a referee for pointing this out. 13 By way of contrast, the estimates for Wood and Transport are all positive whenever they are statistically significant. This indicates that House members are likely to oppose FTA bills if their districts have relatively higher ratios of employment in the agriculture, textile, petrochemical, metal, and electronic industries, whereas they are likely to vote in favor of FTA bills if their districts have relatively higher employment ratios in wood and transportation. The estimates for Food are not statistically significant at any conventional level. In the 109 th Congress, the estimates for Agri, Textile, PetroCh, Metal, Transport, and Electro evidence patterns similar to those in the 108 th Congress. In particular, the estimates for Textile are all negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. However, for the DR-CA FTA bill, the estimate for Wood is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level.
It is worth noting that certain industries such as textiles, apparel, and leather products; petrochemical products including chemicals, plastics, and rubber; and electronics and electrical equipment, have been adversely affected by the FTAs and trade liberalization policy undertaken by the U.S. This can be seen in Table 7 , which shows the top 10 industries with the largest number of TAA approvals in 2005; 14 1,551 cases were approved in total, among which 396 cases were approved for textiles and apparel, 198 cases for electronics, and 127 cases for chemicals and rubber. Therefore, we can confirm that representatives whose districts have larger ratios of employment in these 'trade-sensitive' sectors are, indeed, less likely to vote in favor of FTA bills. 
Comparisons

Comparison with the USITC's Sectoral Effects
In the following sub-section, we compare the estimation results for the FTA bills with the likely effects of the FTAs investigated by the USITC prior to the passage of the bills. The USITC prepares reports that assess the likely effects of possible FTAs with countries on behalf of the USTR. Because these reports provide House members with an important reference when they consider the likely impacts of an FTA bill on their districts, it is useful to compare the results from these reports with our findings. The USITC provides both qualitative and quantitative assessments, with the latter being based on a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, with the exception of the FTAs with Bahrain and Oman, in which a partial equilibrium model was employed. For purposes of comparison, we note
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The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 11 [2011] , Iss. 1 (Topics), Art. 74 DOI: 10.2202 /1935 -1682 .2363 both of these assessments with an emphasis on the most significant sectoral effects of each FTA on U.S. output and employment. We conjecture that if the USITC predicts a negative impact on a certain industry for a possible FTA, a representative whose district has high employment in such an industry is likely to vote against the FTA bill. Additionally, we conduct another test by creating two variables; NegEmp (PosEmp) is the ratio of total district employment in the industries for which the USITC predicted negative (positively) effects from an FTA. When we estimate them, we drop the previous sectoral employment variables.
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With regard to the potential effects of the FTA with Chile, the USITC (2003a) predicts negative effects on agricultural products in terms of domestic output, such as vegetables, fruits and nuts, and employment, whereas it predicts positive effects on machinery and motor vehicles. However, we find that the estimates of the coefficients of Agri and Transport are not statistically significant at any conventional level (see Table 9 ). Similarly, the coefficients of PosEmp and NegEmp are also not statistically significant (see Table 10 ). Table 6 . ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. According to a USITC study (2003b), textiles, apparel, and leather products would be adversely affected by the U.S.-Singapore FTA, whereas effects for vegetables, fruits, nuts, and processed foods would be positive. We find that the coefficient of Textile, as predicted in the USITC report, is both negative and statistically significant, but the coefficients of Agri and Food are not statistically significant at any conventional level. We also find that the coefficient of NegEmp is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, but that of PosEmp is positive but not statistically significant.
For the U.S.-Australia FTA, the USITC (2004a) anticipates negative impacts on agricultural products, particularly meats and cattle, but positive impacts on motor vehicles and parts. Our results in Table 9 show the predicted sign for agriculture, which is the only industry with a statistically significant coefficient. The results in Table 10 also confirm this; the coefficient of NegEmp is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, but that of PosEmp is negative but not statistically significant.
Considering the small economic size of Morocco relative to the U.S., the likely impacts of the U.S.-Morocco FTA on output and employment throughout industries are expected to be rather small (USITC, 2004b) , with relatively large and favorable impacts on grains. However, our results in Table 9 demonstrate that the coefficient of Agri is positive but not statistically significant. This is also the case in Table 10 .
According to the study of USITC (2004c), the negative effects of the DR-CA FTA on output and employment, although small, are anticipated for textiles, apparel, leather, and sugar products. Clearly, as stated in the USITC report, the coefficients of Agri and Textile in Table 9 are negative and statistically significant at the 1% or the 5% level. Similarly, we find a statistically significant and negative coefficient of NegEmp in Table 10 . Hence, House members whose congressional districts have higher employment ratios in the agriculture and textile sectors, which are expected to be negatively affected by the FTA, are likely to vote against the DR-CA FTA bill, ceteris paribus.
The study of USITC (2004d) regarding the potential effects of the U.S.-Bahrain FTA anticipates negative effects for apparel while anticipating positive effects for transportation equipment, although both effects are quite small, due to the small economic size of Bahrain relative to the U.S. Our results in Table 9 also demonstrate with statistical significance that House members whose districts have higher employment ratios in the textile industry are less likely to vote in favor of the Bahrain FTA bill, and those whose districts have higher employment ratios in the transportation industry are more likely to vote for the bill, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, the results in Table 10 show that only NegEmp is statistically significant.
The study of USITC (2006) anticipates modest negative effects from the U.S.-Oman FTA on apparel, but modest positive effects on transportation and machine equipment. According to our results in Table 9 , as is shown in the USITC report, House members whose districts have higher employment ratios in the textile industry are less likely to vote in favor of the Oman FTA bill, all other things being equal. However, the coefficient of Transport is negative but not statistically significant. We can see similar results in Table 10 as well.
In summary, the USITC predicts negative effects on textiles and agriculture from most FTAs considered in the 108 th and 109 th Congresses, a finding that is consistent with our estimation results, meaning that representatives whose districts have relatively high employment ratios in these industries are less likely to vote for these FTAs. However, for other industries in which the USITC's predictions are positive, most notably machinery and transportation equipment, the USITC's results are generally not consistent with our estimation findings. Therefore, it can be argued that representatives' FTA voting behavior is more receptive to the sectors predicted to be adversely affected than to those predicted otherwise.
Some Pair-wise Comparisons between FTA Bills
In the comparison between the Chile FTA and the DR-CA FTA, we expected that the effects of variables for the Chile FTA and the DR-CA FTA would be similar since both are located in Latin America and both are geographically close to the U.S. However, we found little evidence to suggest that the effects of demographic or employment variables were similar. In particular, in the case of Chile, House members are more likely to vote in favor of the FTA bill if their districts have higher ratio of Hispanic in the population, but this is not so clear for the DR-CA FTA. Except for the fact that the employment ratios in the textile and electronic industries negatively affect the members' voting decisions, there are no particular similarities in the employment variables between the two bills. To determine in a formal manner whether the coefficient vectors differ between the two bills, we conduct an F test with the null hypothesis that they are identical. The resulting F statistic is 6.64, which is well above the 5% critical value of 1.67. Hence, we reject the null and confirm that there are no similarities between the Chile and the DR-CA FTA bills.
Bahrain and Oman are both located in the Middle East. Thus, one might anticipate that some variables would have similar effects on House members' decisions, but this assumption is incorrect for most of the variables. Although the coefficients of the employment ratio in the textile industry and the unemployment rate are estimated to be negative and statistically significant at the 1% or the 10% level for both FTA bills, those of other demographic and employment variables have almost no similar influence on members' voting decisions. We test the null that the coefficients are the same between the two bills and reject it.
Singapore and Australia have some common features in that both are among the most economically advanced countries with which the U.S. had an FTA. Both are located in the Asia-Pacific area, and both have close trade relationships with Southeast Asian countries. However, the effects of demographic variables in the districts on representatives' voting behavior differ markedly. For example, NoHS and NoColl are statistically significant variables for the Singapore FTA, but not for the Australia FTA. Furthermore, considering only the statistically significant variables, no employment variable exerts a similar impact on representatives' voting behavior between the two bills. 16 Our formal test results confirm that the voting behavior for each bill is not equal.
Another interesting comparison is between the Chile and Singapore FTA bills, as they not only passed on the same day in the House, but their voting results were quite similar (270 yeas vs. 156 nays for Chile; 272 yeas vs. 155 nays for Singapore). It is difficult to locate any geographic, cultural, or economic similarity between the two countries, except that they are enthusiastically pursuing FTAs with other countries. The USITC reports (2003a and 2003b) also demonstrate that the potential economic effects of both FTAs on the U.S. differ among industries. However, as a matter of fact, many explanatory variables in voting equations exhibit similar effects on voting results for the two bills, with the exception of PetroCh, Transport, and Electro. This similarity implies that although the two FTAs differ with regard to geography and potential economic effects, the voting behavior of representatives do not differ from one another. We can refer to this as the "same-day effect". We conjecture that when they vote up or down the two bills, House members perhaps behave as if they face a single package bill that consists of the two bills. Indeed, in the test, we cannot reject the null that the coefficient vectors are identical between the Chile and Singapore FTA bills; this substantiates the same-day effect. The same-day effect may raise some policy implications regarding the timing of roll-calls for future FTA bills in the House. 
Implications from Marginal Effects
In this section, we discuss the marginal effects of the coefficients in voting equations for the FTA bills in the 108 th and 109 th Congresses. As the probit and tobit models are non-linear, the estimates themselves cannot provide the marginal effects. We calculate the marginal effects for continuous variables by averaging the individual marginal effects across the sample and those for binary variables, such as Dem, taking an average of the differences in estimated probabilities when 16 The effects of employment variables should not necessarily be similar between the two bills, as the two countries have strengths in different sectors. According to the USITC (2003b and 2004a) , while Singapore has a comparative advantage in textiles and electronics, Australia is strong in agricultural products. 17 Although roll call votes for the Australia and Morocco FTA bills were not taken on the same day, they were taken only eight days apart, which led us to expect similar voting behaviors between the two bills. However, it appears that there is no apparent similarity between the impacts of demographic and employment variables on voting behaviors between the two bills. Nevertheless, in the test, we cannot reject the null that the coefficient vectors are identical between the two bills.
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18 Below, we limit our discussion to the variables found to affect voting results commonly throughout the FTA bills. Table 9 reports the marginal effects. First, the marginal effects of campaign funds from business PACs range between 0.04% and 0.10%. This means that a $1,000 increase in business contributions increases the probability that an FTA bill will be approved by 0.04-0.10%p. By way of contrast, a $1,000 increase in labor contributions reduces this probability by a range of 0.05-0.19%p. These marginal effects are not negligible, considering that the standard deviation of business contributions in the 109 th Congress is $335,000 and that of labor contributions is $128,000. Specifically, an increase in business contributions by one standard deviation increases the probability that a representative will vote for an FTA bill in the 109 th Congress by 13.8-19.0%p, whereas a one-standarddeviation increase in labor contributions reduces this probability by 6. 2-25.7%p. 19 According to our results, as a representative changes his or her party from Republican to Democrat, the probability that he or she will approve FTA bills would be reduced by 14.8-44.5%p . 20 Although we rarely find cases in which representatives change their partisanship, this result suggests that if we had two representatives who were alike in all variables other than their political party, then the probability that a Democrat would approve FTA bills would be that much lower than that for a Republican. Furthermore, the marginal effects of party for the DR-CA FTA and the Oman FTA bills, which were passed by very narrow rollcall margins, are far larger in absolute value than those for other FTA bills.
As for the marginal effects of the unemployment rate, a 1%p increase in the unemployment rate in a district reduces the approval rates on FTA bills by 1.2-2.7%p. As for the marginal effects of the employment ratio, a 1%p increase in the employment ratio in the textile, petrochemical, and electronic sectors in a district reduces the probability of a representative's approving an FTA bill by 3. 0-8.9%p, 2.8-3.2%p, and 2.3-3.2%p , respectively. Among them, the marginal effects of textiles are relatively larger than those in the other 'trade-sensitive' sectors.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we use the roll-call results of recent FTA bills in the 108 th (2003) (2004) and 109 th (2005) (2006) Congresses, and evaluate the political and economic factors that may exert influence on House representatives' voting results on these 18 This method is referred to as the average partial effect (Wooldridge, 2006) . 19 For this, we increase every representative's business (labor) contribution by $335,000 ($128,000), calculate the change in the probability that he or she votes for the FTA, and take its average over all representatives. We thank a referee for correcting this. 20 We exclude the case in which estimates on Dem are not statistically significant. bills. We employ a simultaneous probit-tobit model to address the endogeneity of campaign contributions in voting decisions by representatives. Unlike previous literature, we focus on FTA bills to assess any regularity in members' voting behavior across different FTAs. Our results demonstrate that a representative is less likely to approve FTAs if he or she is from a district with a high employment ratio in the industries sensitive to trade liberalization-such as textiles, apparel and leather; petrochemical products; and electronics and electrical equipment.
By comparing our results with the reports of the USITC, we find that representatives in districts with relatively high employment in the sectors for which the USITC expects detrimental effects are likely to vote against the FTA in question. However, our results do not generally endorse the notion that representatives are likely to vote for an FTA when their districts contain the sectors for which the USITC expects positive effects. Thus, we conclude that representatives' FTA voting behavior is more receptive to the sectors predicted to be adversely affected than to those predicted otherwise. Another interesting finding is that FTA bills roll-called on the same day have coefficient estimates that are statistically indistinguishable, but that those roll-called on different points in time have different coefficient estimates even when the partner countries in the FTAs are similar.
Before closing, it is worth mentioning the exclusion assumption in the instrument approach and a future research agenda. We have assumed that ratings by interest groups, a committee membership, and a leadership position in the House affect the voting behavior of representatives only via their influence on PAC contributions. In other words, if they influence the voting decisions of representatives, our analysis attributes this to PAC influence. For future research, it would be worthwhile to construct a panel dataset for FTA bills; this would allow us to control for any unobserved time-invariant individual characteristics. In the current study, we use only two terms of Congress, and the data on political variables, contributions, and demographic variables change little within a couple of terms of Congress. One may construct a panel dataset by expanding the time periods to cover more Congressional terms and include more FTA bills. Notes: We estimate the three FTA bills in the 109 th Congress and the two contribution equations simultaneously in order to take into account any correlation between representatives' voting within the same Congress. Approximate standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Notes: We estimate a linear model for both the contribution equations and the voting equation using two-stage least squares. Approximate standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
A Appendix
